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ABSTRACT
This article is the first major study of protection and valuation
of trade secrets under federal criminal law. Trade secrecy is more
important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for
other intellectual property protections, particularly patents.
Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing
emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating
incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their
theft. Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic
policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little
research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets. One
reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are
notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque
nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at
least some traction in other forms of valuation. Another reason is
that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual
corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not
synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law.
To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret
protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act
of 1996. From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that
trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by
Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5
million but reaching as high as $250 million. There is no notable
difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a
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difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the
sentencing estimates on the other. These findings suggest that the
EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed
by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets are tremendously important . . . probably. Early in
2013, the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator
issued an administration-wide strategy to combat the theft of trade secrets.1
The strategy echoed a commitment to protect American intellectual
property aggressively, a goal which President Obama had set nearly three
years earlier in a speech before the Export-Import Bank2 and which
presidents of both parties have increasingly articulated in recent times.3 In
mid-2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) sent its
first chief economist to testify before the House Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence about the threat that
economic espionage poses for U.S. economic security.4 It was clear that the
Subcommittee appreciated the complex interrelationship among intellectual
property policy, economic analysis, border security, and law enforcement in
protecting commercial secrets, for the slate of witnesses also included an
assistant agency director for investigations from Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and an assistant agency director from the FBI’s
counterintelligence division.5 For its part, Congress, in the landmark
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, expanded the ability of prior
1

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE IP ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, Strategy on
Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets (Feb. 2013), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_t
he_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.
2
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Remarks by the President at the
Export-Import Bank’s Annual Conference (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-export-import-banksannual-conference.
3
E.g., Remarks by President George W. Bush at a Welcoming Ceremony for
President Hu Jintao of China (Apr. 20, 2006), available at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2006-04-24/html/WCPD-2006-04-24-Pg740.htm
(calling for China, inter alia, “to improve enforcement of intellectual property
rights”); Remarks of President William J. Clinton at the World Trade Organization
in Geneva Switzerland (May 18, 1998), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP1998-book1/html/PPP-1998-book1-doc-pg807-2.htm (describing a joint U.S.-Japan
commitment to “protect intellectual property” and, further, calling for broader
consensus within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).
4
House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and
Homeland Security, Hearing (June 28, 2012) (statement of USPTO Chief
Economist Stuart J.H. Graham).
5
House Homeland Security Subcommittee Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and
Homeland
Security,
Hearing,
(June
28,
2012),
available
at
www.homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-economic-espionageforeign-intelligence-threat-american-jobs-and.
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users of a secret product or process to defend against allegations of
infringement under a later-issued patent on the given product or process.6
In a separate provision of the same law, Congress also directed the USPTO
to publish a report by January 2012 on how the protection of trade secrets
through a prior user defense operates in the industrialized world.7
The reason the importance of trade secrets is in question, despite
such strong institutional indicia, reflects the titular question of this article:
far from being an academic or qualitative inquiry, the importance of trade
secrets poses a quantitative challenge to estimate just how important, how
valuable, how worth protecting they are. To help answer that question, this
article offers a comprehensive study assessing the value of trade secrets
based on original data from federal criminal prosecutions for trade secret
misappropriation. Of particular interest are differences between the trade
secret values estimated under various economic methods and the set of
values actually employed in sentencing.
This article contains three parts. Part I summarizes the law and
economics of trade secrecy and introduces the Economic Espionage Act of
1996. Part II presents an empirical study of criminal trade secret
prosecutions, describing the econometric specification and data from the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records service, and other sources. Part III discusses the study’s findings
as well as their normative implications. First in this discussion is a
descriptive view of U.S. federal criminal protection of trade secrecy, based
on comparative estimates of trade secret value. Second is an assessment of
key models for calculating damages and, accordingly, of how best to value
trade secrets. Third is further statistical and econometric analysis of
differences between high and low trade secret value estimates and crossreference values. Fourth is a discussion of the criminal sentencing
implications that follow from the multiplicity of possible trade secret
valuations. The article concludes with an outlook for further research.

6

Pub. L. No. 112–29 § 5 (Sept. 16, 2011), amending 35 U.S.C. § 273. The prior
user defense had previously applied only to business methods and strategies. In
1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc. that methods for doing business are patenteligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998). Congress responded the following year in the American Inventors
Protection Act by creating a safe harbor for firms whose business methods and
strategies could now be the subject of patents asserted against them. Pub. L. No.
106–113, § 4302 (Nov. 29, 1999).
7
USPTO, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE (Jan. 2012), available at
www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf.
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I. THE CONTOURS OF TRADE SECRECY
Protecting trade secrets and penalizing their misappropriation has
long been a part of commercial strategy.8 It was in the nineteenth century,
however, that Anglo-American common law formally recognized trade
secrets as protectable interests.9 Moreover, only in modern economic
strategy have trade secrets emerged as a major mechanism for guarding the
value of intangible assets.10 Particularly in recent years, trade secrecy has
risen in importance as a potentially attractive alternative in the face of
dissatisfaction with aspects of the U.S. patent system,11 including arguments
that various characteristics of the current patent system can actively impede
innovation.12 As a result, a growing literature on appropriating value from
knowledge assets now describes the value of trade secrecy relative to other
mechanisms.13 This literature has two dimensions: legal and economic.

A. The Legal Dimension
1. Trade Secrecy as Intellectual Property
As a legal matter, a trade secret is any information that is the
subject of reasonable efforts to keep it secret and which derives independent
economic value from the maintenance of its secrecy from others who can
benefit economically from its disclosure—be it a “formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.”14 Having no
formal registration requirement, trade secrecy originally arose state by state

8

See generally Stephan R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and
Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 684 (1998).
9
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights,
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 315 (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523
(1837), and Newbery v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.)).
10
See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Importance of Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil
Litigation, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 95-043 (Dec. 1994).
11
See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
12
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
13
See generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing
Firms Patent (Or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552 (Feb. 2000).
14
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (providing a definition for “trade secret”). In a
similar vein, the Restatement defines a trade secret as “any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
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as a common law right.15 However, since the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
was completed in 1979, that model code has been widely adopted in 47
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.16
The modern trend toward interstate uniformity without outright
federalization17 has also produced a robust practitioner-oriented literature on
a variety of subsidiary issues, such as regulatory compliance under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act18 in accounting practices for trade secret assets,19 trends
in federal civil trade secret litigation,20 criminal prosecution,21 and criminal
sentencing.22
For all its practical importance, however, trade secrecy has often
been regarded as a doctrinal aberration in an intellectual property discourse
that is occupied primarily by patents, trademarks, and copyrights.23 Though
these canonical forms of intellectual property are the subjects of their own
15

Mary Witzel, Protecting Pharmaceutical Trade Secrets Under the New
Regulatory Sharing Program, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 737, 742 (2013).
16
NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, “Uniform Law
Commission Legislative Fact Sheet – Trade Secrets Act,” available at
www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act.
17
The latest efforts to create a federal civil cause of action against misappropriation
of a trade secret include the Future of American Innovation (FAIR) Act of 2013, S.
1770, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); The Private Right of Action Against Theft of
Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); and the
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
18
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30,
2002).
19
See, e.g., R. Mark Halligan, Duty to Identify, Protect Trade Secrets Has Arisen:
Sarbanes-Oxley Requires Internal Control Over How They Are Valued, NAT’L LAW
J., Aug. 29, 2005, at S3.
20
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in
Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2009).
21
Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Protecting Trade Secret
and Economic Espionage Act Cases, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN:
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE & TRADE SECRETS, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf.
22
Christopher S. Merriam, Addressing Sentencing Issues in Trade Secret and
Economic Espionage Cases, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN: ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE & TRADE SECRETS, Nov. 2009, at 62, available at www.justice.gov/
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf.
23
See R. Mark Halligan, Protecting U.S. Trade Secret Assets in the 21st Century, 6
No. 1 LANDSLIDE 12, 13 (2013) (noting that “[t]rade secrets have always been
viewed as a stepchild intellectual property right”); Michael P. Simpson, The Future
of Innovation, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1122–25 (2005) (identifying and
criticizing an historical progression of trade secret theory toward a grounding in
intellectual property as distinguished from “traditional” subjects of intellectual
property rights, including patents and copyrights).
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debates as to purpose and form, they are all widely understood as sharing
certain essential features. For example, all three are generally utilitarian
incentive systems.24 Moreover, all three draw their force from federal
organic statutes25 and elaborate regulatory regimes in order to provide a
mechanism for excludably recouping investments in nonrival knowledge
assets.26 For the state-based law of trade secrecy, on the other hand,
commentators have variously proposed doctrinal frameworks based in tort,27
contract,28 and traditional property29—while expressing doubt as to the
conception of trade secrecy as intellectual property proper.30 Nevertheless,
there is now also a growing body of literature to support an intellectual
property-based theory of trade secrecy.31
This literature is both normative and descriptive in its reach. For
example, Professor Mark Lemley identifies the key components of such a
framework with the incentives to invent and to disclose, and with protection
24

See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, “Patents and Human Rights: Where is the
Paradox?” in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 74
(Willem Grosheide, ed.) (2010) (characterizing the traditional conception of
intellectual property as a utilitarian mechanism for impeding free riders in order to
foster innovation). But see Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s
Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 456–57 (2013)
(defining and defending intellectual property under personality theory as a means
for exercising “a fundamental right to oneself” inasmuch as the products of one’s
creative labor are “a manifestation of that self”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–65 (1988) (discussing more generally
the personhood theory of intellectual property law).
25
The federal patent laws are codified in Title 35 of the U.S. Code, the federal
trademark laws in Title 15, and the federal copyright laws in Title 17.
26
Economic theory has long recognized that knowledge has two important traits
that make it difficult to create and easy to copy: first, it is non-rival, or capable of
being used at the same time by infinitely many people without depriving any one of
its use; second, it is not excludable, i.e., pragmatically difficult to deny to
unintended parties. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change,
98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S74 (1990), available at pages.stern.nyu.edu/~promer/
Endogenous.pdf.
27
See, e.g., C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation
Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 55 (1987).
28
See, e.g., Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law
About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347 (1983).
29
See, e.g., Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in AngloAmerican Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313 (1997).
30
Edmund W. Kitch, Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
31
See, e.g., Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and
Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007).
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channels between patents and trade secrets.32 Secrecy requirements in trade
secret law provide what Lemley terms a gatekeeper function. Under this
view, trade secrecy is not a pragmatic means of appropriating the value of
inherently self-disclosing products, as those products have low or no
excludability.33 Thus, secrecy requirements raise the cost of secrecy to
encourage disclosure of information that would otherwise remain secret
while channeling to the patent system those self-disclosing inventions for
which secrecy is futile.34 Similarly drawing on intellectual property
rationales but proposing a principled preference in favor of secrecy where
circumstances warrant, Professor Jonas Anderson argues from patent
reward theory that facilitating choice by the inventor of the proper
protection regime—whether patent or trade secret—is the most efficient
solution to the problem of free riding.35
2. Trade Secrecy and Employment
Closely related to these mechanisms of trade secret protection are
the interactions through which parties exchange and potentially expose
trade secret assets, particularly interactions between employers and
employees. Early American trade secret law took it as virtually axiomatic
that “when a party who has a secret in trade employs persons [subject to
secrecy,] those persons cannot gain the knowledge of the secret and then set
it up against their employer.”36 This protection of company knowledge
through a duty of confidentiality has survived well into modern case law as
well. For example, in Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of an industrial zinc-recovery
furnace manufacturer whose former employees had set up a competing firm
using proprietary metal reclamation processes.37 In fact, the court went
further, imposing liability not only on the former employees but also on

32

See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2009).
33
Professor Lemley’s discussion draws on the distinction developed by Professor
Katherine Strandburg between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions.
See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104–18.
34
Lemley, supra note 32, at 313.
35
See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 962
(2011).
36
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459 (1868) (citing Lord Cranworth’s opinion
in Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241 (1851), regarding the law on “breach of
confidence”).
37
Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1197–98 (5th Cir.
1998).
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their third-party client, who had benefited from the employees’ breach of
confidence.38
However, the protection of trade secrets against a breach of
confidence has not been without limits, particularly where the owner itself
has either compromised its secrecy or relinquished it altogether. For
example, in Group One v. Hallmark Cards, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit applying Missouri state law found that a proprietary method
for producing decorative curled and shredded ribbon was no longer
protectable as a trade secret once the owner had published it in a patent
application, even though the alleged misappropriator was not aware of the
publication.39 The Federal Circuit affirmed a “property theory” view of
trade secrecy that regards the status of the secret as the logical antecedent,
rather than a “relationship theory” view that would have penalized
misappropriation based on the expected connection of confidence between
the owner of the secret and the alleged infringer, such as an employee.40
Moreover, the enthusiasm for protecting trade secrets has, in U.S.
law, stopped short of a more general preference for covenants not to
compete. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained in the
early years of the Sherman Antitrust Act, reasonably limited non-compete
agreements are acceptable as an ancillary provision to generally procompetitive ventures such as a sale of a business operation.41 Judge Taft, in
his limited endorsement of non-compete agreements, found reasonable only
that “the seller should be able to restrain the buyer from doing him an injury
which, but for the sale, the buyer would be unable to inflict. This was not
reducing competition, but was only securing the seller against an increase of
competition of his own creating.”42 This distinction has important practical
ramifications for trade secrecy. For their part, non-disclosure agreements
offer specific and limited protection for trade secrets.43 By contrast, noncompete agreements directly curb the eventual economic harm that trade
secret theft inflicts through greater competition using the misappropriated
38

Id. at 1204 (explaining that “[t]he law imposes liability not only on those who
wrongfully misappropriate trade secrets by breach of confidence but also, in certain
situations, on others who might benefit from the breach”).
39
Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
40
See id. at 1051.
41
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–82 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211, (1899). Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft’s acceptance of
reasonably limited covenants not to compete remains good law. E.g., Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737–38 (1988).
42
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280–81.
43
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (describing the extent of
the property right in a trade secret as coextensive with the protective acts of the
owner in guarding against the secret’s disclosure to others).
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information.44 Yet, precisely because of their broader anticompetitive
potential, these more potent non-compete agreements are generally suspect
in U.S. law.45 As a result, owners must protect their trade secrets through
more piecemeal and, ultimately more costly, contractually tailored
measures.
Meanwhile, examples abound of high-profile misappropriations,
particularly in breaches of the employer-employee relationship. In the
consulting sector, for example, restructuring advisory firm AlixPartners
recently accused two of its former managing directors of stealing
confidential information and trade secrets upon departing to work for
McKinsey & Company.46
AlixPartners also sought to enforce noncompete agreements against the departing directors.47 In high technology, a
seven-year case spanning much of the 2000s ended in the conviction of two
44

See Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 466. The court
explained:
[I]f an employer gives an employee confidential and proprietary
information or trade secrets in exchange for the employee’s promise not to
disclose them, and the parties enter into a covenant not to compete, the
covenant is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement because:
(1) the consideration given by the employer [the trade secrets] in the
otherwise enforceable agreement [exchange of trade secrets for promise
not to disclose] must give rise to the employer’s interest in restraining the
employee from competing [employer has interest in restraining employee
with knowledge of employer’s trade secrets from competing] and
(2) the covenant must be designed to enforce the employee’s
consideration or return promise [the promise not to disclose the trade
secrets] in the otherwise enforceable agreement.
Id. (quoting Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas, 883 S.W.2d 642, 647 n.14
(Tex. 1994) (emphasis added).
45
See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1336 (noting that
“agreements not to compete that might be suspect standing alone are regarded as
reasonable when they are ancillary to a larger endeavor whose success they
promote”) (citing Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189
(7th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted). See also Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg.
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 831 (7th Cir. 1978) (describing a “horizontal
agreement among potential competitors to develop a national brand and not to
compete with each other in selling it [as] considerably more suspect than limitations
imposed by a single independent manufacturer on its distributors as a condition of
their distributorships”).
46
Ashby Jones, AlixPartners Accuses Directors Heading to McKinsey of TradeSecret Theft, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2014, available at blogs.wsj.com/law/
2014/04/10/alixpartners-accuses-directors-heading-to-mckinsey-of-trade-secrettheft/.
47
Complaint at 23–24, AlixPartners v. Thompson, No. 9523 (Ct. Ch. Del. Apr. 9,
2014), available at assets.law360news.com/0527000/527082/File-Stamped%20
Complaint.pdf.
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Silicon Valley engineers for stealing chip design documents from four
former employers.48 In heavy industry, during the late 2000s, metal
component and assembly manufacturer Metaldyne successfully pursued
departing employees, including a former vice-president and a metallurgist,
for trying to sell powdered-metal manufacturing processes to rival
companies.49
Prominent examples have also come from finance. In 2009,
Goldman Sachs alleged that departing programmer Sergey Aleynikov had
stolen computer code related to the firm’s proprietary high-speed trading
platform, and that Aleynikov planned to offer similar capabilities to his new
employer, Teza Technologies.50 While Aleynikov’s conviction was
pending on appeal, French multinational bank Société Générale was
similarly vindicated in the criminal conviction of former trader Samarth
Agrawal for stealing the bank’s high-speed trading software, which he had
planned to replicate for the Manhattan hedge fund Tower Research
Capital.51 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later reversed
Aleynikov’s criminal conviction, holding that computer code could neither
be a stolen “good” nor be “related to or included in a product that is
produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce” for criminal
purposes.52 A separate decision in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey went further, directing Goldman Sachs to pay
Aleynikov’s legal fees.53 Nevertheless, Congress disagreed with these
judicial conclusions about computer code as an economic good that is
protectable under federal criminal law. Congress subsequently reaffirmed
the importance of trade secrecy to intangible and informational assets such
as software code and expanded the legal scope of trade secret protection to
cover such assets via the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012.54

48

The former employers were NEC Electronics, Sun Microsystems, Transmeta, and
Trident Microsystems. Natalie Weinstein, 2 Engineers Sentenced for Espionage,
CNET, Nov. 22, 2008, www.cnet.com/news/2-engineers-sentenced-for-espionage/.
49
Megan Lampinen, Former Metaldyne Employees Plead Guilty to Information
Theft, AUTOMOTIVE WORLD, Sept. 19, 2008, www.automotiveworld.com/
analysis/70969-us-former-metaldyne-employees-plead-guilty-to-information-theft/.
50
Ashby Jones, Manhattan Jury Finds Former Goldman Programmer Guilty,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2010, available at blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/10/.
51
Bon Van Voris, SocGen Ex-Trader Agrawal Sentenced for Software Theft,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 1, 2011, www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-28/exsociete-generale-trader-gets-3-years-in-prison-for-theft-1-.html.
52
United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2012).
53
Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2013 WL 5739137, No. 12–5994
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013).
54
Pub. L. No. 112–236 (Dec. 28, 2012).
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The legislative debate specifically and unfavorably cited the Aleynikov
reversal as the motivation for the new law.55

B. The Economic Dimension
Beyond legal doctrine, trade secrecy has likewise benefited in its
economic dimensions from foundational analytical work by Professors
Friedman and Landes and Judge Posner.56 Further theoretical refinements
to this work have addressed issues such as strategic delay, the dynamics of
trade secret accumulation, the relationship of invention scale and the
strength of property rights to the desirability of trade secrecy, the value of
trade secret licensing relative to other forms of protection, the treatment of
trade secrets in collaborative research and development relationships, and
the impact of trade secrecy upon improvement in research and development
performance.
Strategic delay, for example, may be modeled as a decision on the
part of basic innovators not to patent their innovations—or, more precisely,
not to develop their innovations for patentability—immediately.57 An
innovator firm often has an incentive to opt out of the patent system initially
and proceed using trade secrecy in developing applications of its knowledge
assets because of the relative immediacy with which rival firms may reverse
engineer publicly introduced applications of the innovation or infer the
innovation from the published patent application.58 However, the nature of
the incentive to delay rests on competing effects. A larger number of rival
firms in the market tends to diffuse the innovation more quickly, which then
influences the innovator firm to wait and appropriate more applications of
its innovation and to share fewer remaining applications with rival firms.59
At the same time, delay by the innovator firm also delays its own payoff
with regard to already-developed applications.60
The resulting
maximization problem has a unique positive solution, meaning that the
innovator firm will choose to delay introducing its applications by an
optimal time and reap optimal discounted profits.61
Within the firm, optimal accumulation of trade secret assets may be
a function both of investment in the protection of the firm’s trade secrets

55

158 Cong. Rec. S6968 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 2012).
See generally David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
57
Carmen Matutes, Pierre Regibeau & Katherine E. Rockett, Optimal Patent
Design and the Diffusion of Innovation, 27 RAND J. ECON. 60, 61 (1996).
58
Id. at 63.
59
Id. at 64–65.
60
Id. at 64.
61
Id.
56
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and in employee compensation.62 In practice, this is particularly important
in hierarchically-modeled firms in which managers have access to all trade
secrets at or below their managerial level. When such a firm wishes to
protect trade secrets at a given managerial level, all higher-level managers
will also have access to it, and the firm must compensate them all enough to
keep them from defecting to rival firms.63 As a result, such firms may find
it more profitable to allow lower-level trade secrets to dissipate rather than
pay to protect every last secret.64 Thus, managers will tend to increase their
own wage value by overinvesting in the protection of those trade secrets to
which they themselves have access and by overcompensating their
subordinates to prevent defection.65 However, this overinvestment will
come at the expense of higher direct cost to the firm in trade secret security
as well as higher indirect cost to the firm in higher wages for superior
managers, who face the same case with a wider array of the firm’s trade
secrets.66
As between an innovator firm and an imitator firm, the need and
value of interfirm or public disclosure in order to exploit innovations are
often at odds with the threat of imitation depending on the strength of
available property rights in the innovation.67 Modeling this relationship as
duopoly competition where the innovator firm has various kinds of private,
asymmetric information about the innovation reveals an inverse relationship
between the strength of available property rights and the resulting tendency
toward disclosure.68 To wit, innovators tend to patent and fully disclose
small innovations, to patent and only partially disclose larger innovations to
manage imitation through licensing, and to rely primarily on secrecy for
very large innovations.69
Broadening this comparison of intellectual property protections,
when private returns from innovation are the same whether patenting or
maintaining trade secrecy, social returns are greater where the innovator
chooses secrecy with licensing over disclosure by patenting.70 Because this
effect results from the lack of an independent creation defense in patent
62

Jan Zabojnik, A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms, 43 INT’L ECON. REV. 831
(2002).
63
Id. at 833.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 834.
66
Id.
67
James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing
Intellectual Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1 (2004).
68
Id. at 2–3.
69
Id. at 3.
70
Franco Cugno & Elisabetta Ottoz, Trade Secrets vs. Broad Patents: The Role of
Licensing, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 209 (2006).
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law,71 secrecy is not superior to regimes of intellectual property protection
such as copyright, where such a defense does exist.72
Summarizing this body of theoretical literature through a simple
model illustrates a key objective of this article. Suppose that a trade secret
with some determinable value L is at risk of theft with some probability p.
The probability p itself depends on the vigilance of the firm that owns the
trade secret in protecting its trade secrets. As the firm’s expenditure x on
preventing trade secret loss grows, its probability p of suffering
misappropriation declines. Thus, p = p(x) and decreases monotonically.73
Aside from the risk of misappropriation, the firm may also lose its trade
secret through accidental disclosure or reverse engineering with some
probability q and so incurs some expenditure y to prevent this form of loss.
Thus, q = q(y) and also decreases monotonically. The firm’s objective
function is a minimand: to minimize the sum of (1) the expected loss due to
trade secret dissipation, either by misappropriation or by accidental
disclosure or reverse engineering, and (2) the cost of developing and
implementing preventive procedures to protect trade secrets.
If the firm is selling one unit of output at a given cost, which is
independent of the costs of protecting trade secrets, then the total expected
loss EL, with x and y within the control of the firm, is expressible by the
following function:
EL(x, y) = p(x)[1 – q(y)] + q(y)[1 – p(x)] + p(x)q(y)L + x + y
The first-order conditions for minimizing this function with respect to x and
y may be re-expressed as:
L = –1 / [p’(1 – q)]
and
L = –1 / [q’(1 – p)]
Both must both be positive. Thus, the greater the value of trade secrecy and
the more efficient the method of preventing trade secret loss, the greater the
amount spent on protecting trade secrecy.
Indeed, this article is partly an empirical exploration of the
Friedman-Landes-Posner theoretical framework and subsequent
refinements: to put values to L and to determine the probability distribution
and relative magnitudes of those values in accordance with the methods by
which they are calculated. In doing so, this article also takes note of
71

Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 218–19.
73
In simplified terms, a monotonic function is one that is everywhere increasing or
everywhere decreasing, i.e., where a < b, f(a) < f(b), and vice-versa.
72
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increasing dissatisfaction over the last decade in both academia and industry
with patenting as a means for protecting intellectual property,74 and an
increasing enthusiasm instead for using trade secrecy and related strategies,
such as lead time advantage, be it to protect product innovations75 or to raise
profits and stimulate clustering without inhibiting technological spillovers.76
For data with which to conduct the empirical exploration, federal criminal
prosecutions pursuant to the Economic Espionage Act of 199677 (EEA) are
a rich and largely untapped source of insight into trade secret valuation.

C. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The EEA was a legislative response to the perceived growing
disparity between federal protections for disclosed inventions and creative
works in the form of private civil causes of action in patent and copyright,
as compared with the absence of federal protections for trade secrets.78
Congress regarded the EEA to be all the more urgent because of the
importance of “proprietary economic information” to the national security
interests of the United States.79
As a matter of definition, the EEA distinguishes between trade
secret misappropriation in the more conventional sense (“theft for pecuniary

74

E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
75
E.g., Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms
Patent (Or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552 (Feb. 2000).
76
E.g., Sudipto Bhattaccharya & Sergei Guriev, Patents and Trade Secrets:
Knowledge Licensing and Spillovers, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1112 (2006).
Professors Bhattaccharya and Guriev contrast knowledge licensing and spill-overs
under patenting and trade secrets in a model which treats trade secrets as so-called
“closed” sales of intellectual property. A closed sale aims to preclude the
disclosing of trade secrets to the research departments of rival firms. The greater
the value of interim knowledge and the greater the leaking of this knowledge, the
more attractive the closed sale will be. See also Andrea Fosfuri & Thomas Rønde,
High Tech Clusters, Technology Spillovers, and Trade Secret Laws, 22 INT’L J.
INDUSTRIAL ORG. 45 (2004) (arguing that trade secret protection based on punitive
damages increases trade secret spillover and clustering).
77
Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as amended in sections of
18 and 42 U.S.C.).
78
See H.R. REP. NO. 104–788, 104th Cong., 2d sess. 4–7 (1996) (discussing the
growing importance of proprietary economic information and explaining the need
for legislation).
79
Id.
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gain”)80 and economic espionage (“theft for the benefit of a foreign
entity”).81 Important to both, however, are three procedural safeguards.
First is the availability of protective orders to safeguard the integrity of
trade secrets during otherwise public prosecutions of their theft.82 Second is
specific authority for the EEA to have extraterritorial reach,83 in contrast to
the general principle that acts of Congress have force only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.84 Third is limited prosecutorial
discretion in pursuing possible violations of the EEA. Originally, this
safeguard was quite limiting, as approval was initially necessary from
senior officials in the DOJ with respect to both economic espionage and
trade secret theft. This requirement is now somewhat relaxed, and DOJ
prosecutors have greater independence with respect to pursuing trade secret
theft cases.85
Beyond these important but ultimately straightforward parameters,
the empirical valuation of the stolen trade secrets has since become central
to enforcement of the EEA. Valuation is the foremost inquiry, whether in
selecting cases to prosecute,86 determining the length of sentence to impose,
or establishing the magnitude of fine to assess.87 Yet neither the text nor the
legislative history of the EEA directly discuss the complex issue of trade
secret valuation, and during the EEA’s initial enforcement in the late 1990s,
it was expected that the federal criminal justice system would look for
valuation guidance in case law applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.88

80

Charles Doyle, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of
18 U.S.C. 1831 and 1832, Congressional Research Service Report No. R42681,
July 25, 2014, at 1–9, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf.
81
Id. at 9–11.
82
Id. at 11. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1835; United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189,
193–94 (3d Cir. 1998) (protecting trade secrets unless they are essential to defend
against the case).
83
Doyle, supra note 80, at 11–12.
84
Id. See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010);
Charles Doyle, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law,
Congressional Research Service Report No. 94–166, Feb. 15, 2012, available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-166.pdf.
85
Doyle, supra note 80, at 12 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 1122).
86
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REPORTING THEFT CHECKLIST, available at
www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/reportingchecklist-ts.pdf. (noting that the
FBI asks victims to place the estimated value of the stolen trade secret within a
range.)
87
Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Calculating Loss Under the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 323 (2000).
88
See, e.g., id. at 328–337 (comparing lost profits, disgorgement, reasonable
royalty, and replacement cost approaches for determining loss in civil trade secret
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Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee report on the EEA only briefly
discussed that “the very conditions that make this proprietary information so
much more valuable make it easier to steal,”89 and that, “[g]iven the
increased use of electronic information systems, information can now be
stolen without asportation and the original usually remains intact.”90 Yet,
this well-theorized nonrival and variously nonexcludable nature of
information91—enabling, e.g., theft without asportation—drives not only
value and theft risk in trade secrets, but also difficulty in valuation.
Like the employer-employee cases discussed above,92 a recent case
illustrates the large values at risk from trade secrecy theft, the gravity with
which federal enforcement institutions treat such theft, and the variability of
valuation even when culpability is clear and the economic loss thoroughly
documented. In June 2010, biotechnology research scientist Kexue Huang
was indicted for misappropriating and transporting trade secrets to the
People’s Republic of China while working for Dow AgroSciences LLC.93
A separate indictment in 2011 additionally charged Mr. Huang with stealing
a trade secret from Cargill Inc.94 On October 18, 2011, Dr. Huang pled
guilty both to economic espionage against Dow AgroSciences and to trade
secret theft against Cargill, admitting the estimated aggregate loss from his
criminal conduct to be in the range of $7 million to AgroSciences and $20

cases and noting the relevance of these approaches to criminal prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges alike in evaluating loss under the EEA).
89
H.R. REP. NO. 104–788, supra note 78, at 4–5.
90
Id. at 11.
91
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); R. Polk Wagner,
Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of
Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1001–16 (2003). By contrast to this
understanding, however, Professor Christopher Yoo has suggested that copyright is
excludable and partially nonrivalrous, making it an imperfect public good at best.
See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004).
92
See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
93
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Chinese National
Charged with Economic Espionage Involving Theft of Trade Secrets from Leading
Agricultural Company Based in Indianapolis (Aug. 31, 2010), available at
www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/press-releases/2010/ip083110a.htm. See United States v.
Huang, No. 1:10-CR-00102 (N.D. Ind., filed June 16, 2010).
94
Karen Gullo, Ex-Dow Scientist Who Stole Secrets Gets 7 Years, 3 Months Prison,
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2011, www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-22/exdow-scientist-who-stole-secrets-gets-7-years-3-months-prison.html. See United
States v. Huang, No. 1:11-CR-00163 (N.D. Ind., transferred in Sept. 9, 2011)
(giving the history of the case against Huang).
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million to Cargill, respectively.95 The court ultimately sentenced Mr.
Huang to seven and a quarter years in prison.96 Importantly, the Huang
prosecutions also reflect a more basic distributive problem in attempting to
describe the more publicly protected value of trade secrets in the criminal
context, in contrast with the corrective private remedy appropriate to the
civil context.97
Thus, although civil trade secret valuations still remain the polestar
of guidance in valuation for criminal cases,98 it is of no small consequence
that trade secret protection under the EEA has also benefited in recent years
from broader debate about the proper scope of trade secrecy at the federal
level.99 Moreover, greater study of intangible asset valuation in patents,100
copyrights,101 and trademarks102 has produced a literature ready for similar
study on trade secrets.

95

See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 93.
Gullo, supra note 94.
97
Jason M. Solomon, What Is Distributive Justice, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 323
(2010) (observing that the concern of civil justice with rectifying imbalances makes
it “distinct from retributive or distributive justice”). Professor Solomon identifies
three principal dimensions of difference between civil and criminal justice
notwithstanding that both attempt to redress moral injuries: (1) the different
exercises of agency by the individual or the state in prosecuting civil versus
criminal wrongs; (2) the individual’s interest in private vindication and
empowerment versus the state’s interest in retribution and deterrence; and (3) the
nature and degree of disapprobation awaiting the wrongdoer in a civil remedy, such
as money, versus in a criminal remedy, such as imprisonment. Id. at 327–28.
98
See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87.
99
For example, former Senator Herbert Kohl in October, 2011, introduced an
amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 1836 to create a federal civil private cause of action
under the EEA over and above the existing authority of the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief. See S. Amdt. 729, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
100
See, e.g., Malcolm T. Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, Patent Valuation: Aren’t
We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent
Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount
Rate Using the CAPM, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 194 (2010); Michael S.
Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios through
Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463 (2007); F.
Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the
Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1181–93
(2003).
101
See, e.g., Matthew J. Baker & Brendan M. Cunningham, Court Decisions and
Equity Markets: Estimating the Value of Copyright Protection, 49 J.L. & ECON. 567
(2006); John M. Gabala, Jr., “Intellectual Alchemy”: Securitization of Intellectual
Property As an Innovative Form of Alternative Financing, 3 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 307 (2004).
96
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II. PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE EEA
To that literature, this article makes three principal contributions.
First, using an original dataset, we analyze the size distribution of the values
of the EEA trade secrets. Second, we examine evidence of statistical
differences between estimates of trade secret values, using different
valuation methods and arriving at surprising results about the commonality
of intent in courts’ valuation methods. Finally, we find statistically
significant differences both between high and low estimates of trade secret
value and between valuations argued during prosecution and those
employed at sentencing.

A. Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study examines 95 EEA prosecutions involving 147
defendants during the period of 1996–2008. Data is from statements and
releases that the DOJ has issued about prosecutions the Criminal Division
has conducted, especially the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section of that division,103 and from the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) service.104 Once identified, EEA cases prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. § 1832 were further analyzed using docket reports, viz., lists and
summaries of judicial proceedings such as appearances and actions;
underlying court documents regarding filing and termination dates,
sentences, fines, and conviction; and journalistic accounts discussing
qualitative details such as the victim’s relationship to the defendant, the
alleged value of the stole trade secrets, and parallel civil actions. Not least,
academic publications also yielded information about particular cases in the
context of the EEA.105 The quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered
from this wide range of data sources enables a robust inferential discussion
beyond the descriptive accounts published to date, and supports greater
normative discussion of the use and theft of trade secrets and of relevant
available policy levers.

102

See, e.g., Espen Robak, Lessons from Nestle v. Comm’r: Second Circuit Rejects
Popular Trademark Valuation Method, 26 J. CORP. TAX’N 135 (1999); GORDON V.
SMITH, TRADEMARK VALUATION (1997).
103
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, available at www.justice.gov/.
104
PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, available at www.pacer.gov/.
105
These include Robin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial
Applications of the Economic Espionage Act and the TRIPS Agreement, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1475 (2003); Chris Carr & Larry R. Gorman, The Revictimization of
Companies by the Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the
Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW. 25 (2001); Chris Carr, Jack Morton &
Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000); Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87.
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B. Econometric Model
The threshold econometric question of how trade secrets are likely
distributed in their value looks to the observed values of stolen trade secrets
that have come to light in EEA prosecutions. The expected distribution is
lognormal,106 owing to a combination of Gibrat’s Law of Proportional
Effects107 and the Central Limit Theorem.108 The reason for this expectation
is that, as applied to firms, Gibrat’s Law posits that the growth rates of
firms are a random process and are independent of their initial size, e.g., as
measured by assets. That is, because firm size is distributed lognormally,
the underlying growth process is proportionate.
More formally, if size is measured by assets, then given an asset
value At at time period t, the change in asset size over one time period is a
random proportion of its size in the previous period:
(1) At – At–1 = t At–1
where  t has mean zero and is serially uncorrelated. From this, it follows
that the growth rate of At is expressible as:
(2) (At – At–1) / At–1 = A / At–1 = t
Taking the summation of both sides of equation (2) over a number of
periods I shows that:
(3) ∑(t=1 to  (A / At–1) = ∑(t=1 to  (t)
Moreover, if one lets the finite change in assets A in the numerator of the
left hand side of equation (3) tend toward the small differential dA, and
therefore going to the integral from the sum, then in the limit, the following
approximation holds:
(4) ∑(t=1 to  (A / At–1) = ∫(from A0 to A (dA / A) = ln A – ln A0
which is equal to the right hand side:
(5) ∑(t t)
106

See generally Brian E. Smith & Francis J. Merceret, The Lognormal
Distribution, 31 C. MATHEMATICS J. 259 (2000), available at www.jstor.org/
stable/pdfplus/10.2307/2687413.pdf (explaining that lognormal distribution is a
probability distribution in which the logarithm of the random variable takes a
normal distribution).
107
See Jan Eeckhout, Gibrat’s Law for Cities, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 1429 (2004);
ROBERT GIBRAT, LES INÉGALITES ÉCONOMIQUES (1931).
108
See generally David A. Thomas, Understanding the Central Limit Theorem, 77
MATHEMATICS TEACHER 542 (1984), available at www.jstor.org/stable/
pdfplus/10.2307/27964198.pdf (explaining that the theorem predicts that, for a set
of independent random variables, each with a well-defined expected value and
variance, the mean of such variables will be approximately normally distributed).
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Given initial asset value A0, equations (3), (4), and (5) are expressible as:
(6) ln AI = ln A0 + 1 + 2 + … + I
By the Central Limit Theorem, the right-hand side of equation (6) will, in
the limit as I → ∞, be normally distributed. Thus, the distribution at
equilibrium of the logarithm of asset value ln A may be denoted as:
(7) ln A ~ N(, 2)
which is a normal distribution having mean  and variance 2. By
definition, if the natural logarithm of A is normally distributed, then A is
lognormally distributed, denoted as:
(8) A ~ ln(, 2)
Thus, Gibrat’s Law of Proportional Effects results in a lognormal
equilibrium distribution of assets.
Moreover, applied to trade secrets, Gibrat’s Law implies that, for a firm
whose trade secrets have an asset value of A in a given year, each trade
secret asset generates, or can have imputed to it, an annual income Y for the
firm. If the annual rate of interest is r, then the following simple
proportional relationship will hold:
(9) Y = r × A
This proportion reflects a premise that industry practice confirms: the
designated value of a trade secret is often based on the income stream
attributable to that trade secret.

C. Valuation Models
A review of trade secret valuation models reveals important
considerations for their application. Three major sets of models merit
discussion: income models, cost models, and market models.
1. Income Models
The income models—unjust enrichment, lost profits, and
reasonable royalty—base the valuation of the trade secret on cash flow
analysis. These models have theoretically robust foundations, and the
discounted cash flow approach in particular is a standard tool in financial
analysis.109 This standardization suggests that, not only are firms more
likely to be familiar with income models of valuation and related methods,
but also that they constitute a well-theorized and therefore potentially
powerful legal tool for litigants and courts.
109

See generally JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION: APPLICATIONS AND
MODELS (2d ed., 2006).

138

WHAT’S IT WORTH TO KEEP A SECRET?

[Vol. 13

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act itself supports the use of income
models. The model act states:
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation
and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken
into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages measured by
any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a
misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.110

The UTSA’s reference to “actual loss” suggests that valuation of the trade
secret may properly include lost profits, actual damages, or both. The use
of the income models in UTSA cases also underscores the high analytical
regard in which these models are held and implicitly connects the
considerable case law surrounding the UTSA with broader questions of
trade secret valuation.
Particularly among the income models, the reasonable royalty
model is appealing as it can be implemented regardless of the actions of the
alleged misappropriator or thief. Unlike the unjust enrichment and lost
profits models, which both require actual unauthorized use of the trade
secret, the reasonable royalty model is universally applicable.111
Despite this high regard, useful grounding in the case law, and wide
applicability, the EEA data show only one identified case involving the use
of reasonable royalty. Indeed, income models more generally were used in
only one-third of all EEA cases studied. Thus, in spite of its theoretical
potential from an economic perspective, the method is not popular in
practice. Reasons for this relative disuse may range from pragmatic
concerns about the relative economic incentives and payoffs associated with
the reasonable royalty model (or income models more generally),112 to more
foundational cultural differences between more theoretically oriented
economic arguments and more pragmatically inclined legal institutional
110

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, available at
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf.
111
See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 342–46 (arguing for the use of the
reasonable royalty model in EEA cases as being most in line with Sentencing
Guidelines). To wit, Zwillinger and Genetski argue that: “When ascertainable, this
[reasonable royalty] measure values stolen information at the moment and in the
context of the misappropriation, and it takes into account, but does not exclusively
rely upon, the defendant’s intention to exploit information.”
112
Cf., e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (advancing both theoretical and empirical arguments
in the patent context that the reasonable royalty model tends, at least in component
industries, systematically to overcompensate patent owners for inventions that are
part of larger products rather than compensate them in proportion to the incremental
value of the patented invention).
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actors113—particularly as reasonable royalty calculations, unlike other
models, rely entirely on a hypothetical agreement between a willing
licensee and willing licensor, an exercise fraught with its own analytical
challenges. 114
2. Cost Models
The cost models—research and development, replacement costs,
and actual damages—are based on the idea that the trade secret is worth the
amount that it cost its owner to develop or protect, or would cost to
redevelop. These models, too, are involved in approximately one-third of
the EEA cases identified here for study. Significantly, innovative firms are
likely to keep good accounts of research and development costs, a tendency
that makes the model appealing for its ease of application.115 In practice,
however, research and development investment alone may not represent the
empirical minimum value, as comparison of the cost models in EEA cases
shows.116
With regard to usage of the cost models, the actual damages
approach was involved in five cases, representing 17% of the EEA cases
with identified trade secret value estimates. Despite the lack of theoretical
robustness—e.g., damages associated with the misappropriation could, to
varying degrees, be independent of the underlying value of the trade
secret—calculation of actual damages presents a fairly straightforward legal
matter. The victim must merely present evidence of the direct costs
resulting from the theft.
113

See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13–24 (2001) (criticizing prevalent
approaches to the economic analysis of tort law for inadequately representing the
full complexity of that body of legal doctrine).
114
Cf., e.g., Elyse Dorsey & Matthew R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order
Alters the Process and Outcomes of Frand Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
979, 983 (2013) (noting the importance of ex ante versus ex post perspectives on
investing in a patented technology rather than a next-best alternative and the
associated problems of switching costs, lock-in, and—in the undesirable case—
holdup by the patentee). The problem can be even more challenging in the
reputationally charged realm of enjoining copyright infringement. See Jiarui Liu,
Copyright Injunctions After Ebay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
215, 264 (discussing doctrinal concerns peculiar to copyright).
115
See MARK A. GLICK, LARA A. REYMANN & RICHARD HOFFMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 337 (2002) (arguing that “the
owner’s investment in the trade secret can be used as a proxy for the trade secret’s
minimum value”).
116
See infra Part 0 (discussing the lack of statistically significant difference among
the average values generated by using cost models in the EEA cases identified for
study).
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3. Market Models
Market models seek to define a fair market value of the trade secret.
The Sentencing Guidelines favor the use of fair market value, when
available:
The fair market value of the property unlawfully taken or destroyed or,
if the fair market value is impractical to determine or inadequately
measures the harm, the cost to the victim of replacing that property.117

However, the market models have generated the widest range of
trade secret valuations of the three types of models. This variation is likely
due to the relative subjectivity in measuring fair market value as compared
to other models. The reported range actually represents a conservative
estimate, as the removed outlier—$108 million in the Lucent case118—was
calculated using fair market value approach. The use of fair market value
estimates is limited by the type of trade secret: that is to say, there may be a
limited market for the trade secrets in question as they are often quite
industry- or technology-specific. Bid information, for example, has no
legitimate fair market value, as no legal market exists for bid information.
As a result, while the sentencing guidelines may call for the utilization of
fair market value, its application is neither straightforward nor widespread.

III. DISCUSSION
From this framework, the estimated values of stolen trade secrets in
EEA prosecutions are variously grouped by the valuation model used for
estimation, as well as by low, high, and cross-reference estimates. The low,
or conservative, estimates receive greater emphasis in accordance with prior
literature.119 Low and high estimates are deflation-adjusted to 2008 values.

A. Estimates Across Valuation Models
Analysis of the EEA data initially reveals apparent differences
among trade secret value estimates produced by different valuation
methods. Table 1 presents cases according to the valuation method used,
based on low estimates. In cases where an estimate of the stolen trade
secret was published, roughly two-thirds identified the estimation method
that the court used. As mentioned above, one observation was removed as a

117

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 332
(4th ed. 2013), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/.
118
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
119
See, e.g., Carr & Gorman, supra note 105.
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clear outlier—an estimate of $108 million for the Lucent source code
derived using the market value method.120
Similarly, comparing valuation methodologies against the resulting
value estimates, using the low estimates, shows marked clustering of values
at the lower end of the scale. This is consistent with previous findings of
lognormality in the distribution of estimated trade secret values, where the
cases proportionally most prevalent are associated with very low value
estimates.
However, the distribution of these values across calculation
methods does not, at least for the small sample of 21 observations, indicate
systematic differences among value estimates produced by these valuation
methods.121 This lack of observed differences in the observed means of the
various models admits of two explanations.
One explanation is that, while different valuation models do
produce meaningfully different value estimates, the sample size of 21
observations is too small to detect such differences. However, the estimates
generated here have relied on small sample distribution theory to mitigate
this problem, suggesting an alternate explanation. That is, no meaningful
difference exists among the methodological premises of the various
valuation models. The diverse valuation methods are based on the same
economic theory, and merely approach the goal from different directions.
What is more, although different valuation methods may, in practice,
produce somewhat different valuations for the same trade secret, no
systematic difference need result across the methods themselves.
Nevertheless, though trade secret value estimates may not vary
significantly from one valuation model to another, comparison across high,
low, and cross-reference estimates reveals a quite different story, one with
120

United States v. ComTriad et al, No. 2:01-cr-00365 (D.N.J., filed May 31, 2001)
(noting that, in the Lucent case, the source code technology that the defendants
stole was generating on the order of $100 million in sales for Lucent in 2000. This
was deemed an outlier because it is five times the value of its closest neighbor and
seven standard deviations from the mean).
121
Two tests confirm the absence of statistically significant differences among the
various valuation methods. First is the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, which
here yields the following diagnostics: F = 1.11, and prob value = 0.39, indicating
lack of significance in the differences. Second is the student’s t-test for differences
between the means of various categories of valuation—i.e., grouping
methodologies as income models, cost models, and market models—which here
yields prob value = 0.80 for cost vs. income, prob value = 0.50 for cost vs. market,
and prob value = 0.28 for cost vs. market, all indicating a lack of significance in the
differences. Notably, all of these tests were conducted using logarithmically
transformed observations to take account of the known lognormality of the
variables.
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important normative implications for the protection of trade secrets under
federal criminal law. As a point of departure for these comparisons, it is
helpful first to understand how trade secret values are statistically
distributed.

B. Distribution and Comparison of Trade Secret Values
As shown in Figure 1, the majority (79 percent) of stolen trade
secrets are worth less than $5 million. The sample size for low value
estimates is 29 observations; the mean of low estimates is $4.47 million, the
standard deviation is $9.95 million, and the mode—i.e., the value for a
maximum on the probability density—is much lower. The distribution of
Figure 1 strongly suggests lognormality and is defined only for positive
values of the variate, is unimodal, and is strongly positively skewed, with a
typical long tail stretching to positive infinity. Lognormality at a larger
sample would predict a smoother long right tail for the probability density.
A formal test of lognormality appears in Figure 2, where all data points are
within the 95 percent confidence interval and the corresponding linear
function is fitted by maximum likelihood.122
Similar results hold for the high estimates, as shown in Figure 3,
where the mean value is $26.3 million, the standard deviation is $88.7
million, and the modal value is again well below the mean. Moreover, as
shown in Figure 4, the high estimates all lie within the 95% confidence
interval123 and thus reflect a lognormal distribution for the same reasons as
the low estimates discussed in Figures 1 and 2.

C. Differences in Estimation
1. Low and High Estimates

122

Further confirmation comes from the Anderson-Darling (AD) test for departures
from normality. See generally Michael A. Stephens, Tests Based on EDF Statistics,
in RALPH B. D’AGOSTINO & MICHAEL A. STEPHENS, GOODNESS-OF-FIT
TECHNIQUES (1986). In general, the greater the AD statistic, the less the support for
a hypothesis of lognormality. Conversely, the larger the probability value, the less
the ability of the test to reject a null hypothesis of lognormality. The AD statistic in
Figure 2 enables comparison between distributions where smaller values are
preferred. Here, the AD statistic for the lognormal distribution (AD = 0.6) is lowest
as compared to several alternate distributions. The probability value calculation,
based on the AD statistic, gives p-value = 0.108. As the null hypothesis is that the
data reflect a lognormal distribution, and the p-value in this case is greater than
0.05, the null hypothesis is not rejected with 95 percent confidence, and the
distribution of low estimates in trade secret value is, indeed, lognormal.
123
The Anderson-Darling statistic (AD = 0.48) is even lower, with p-value = 0.221.
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Because most trade secrets in the analysis have two estimated
values—a low estimate and a high estimate—it is possible to test for a
statistical difference between them using a paired t-test. As shown in Table
2, the sample size is restricted to those cases in which the high estimate is
distinct from the low estimate. Though this reduces the sample size to 16
observations, the results agree with those of the unreduced sample. Based
on the previously determined lognormality of the sample, the test is run on
the natural logarithms of the estimated values.
Although the high and low estimates are correlated,124 the paired ttest indicates that the means of the two samples are statistically different.125
Economically, this difference is highly meaningful in that it reflects as
much as a $39.6 million difference between high and low estimates, based
on the untransformed values of the means. A further non-parametric test,
the Wilcoxon test, confirms on weaker assumptions that the statistical
difference between the two samples is highly significant.126 Moreover, just
as Figures 2 and 4 give strong evidence of lognormality in the distribution
of trade secret value estimates, the probability plot of the relation between
high and low estimates shown in Figure 5 both reaffirms the lognormality
of value estimates generally and highlights the differences between the high
and low estimates.
The implications of this statistical difference between high and low
estimates are far-reaching. The alleged value of the stolen trade secrets
affect—sometimes strongly—everything from the reporting of trade secret
theft,127 to the decision to prosecute,128 to sentencing determinations.
Substantial differences in estimated value for the same trade secret increases
uncertainty for owners of trade secrets and support the problematic view
that valuation is sensitive to the viewpoint, and interests, of the party
offering the value estimate. Given the high burden of proof in criminal
prosecution, this presents a problem for achieving justice when sentencing
trade secret misappropriators and thieves.
124

The coefficient of correlation is 0.46, significant at 10 percent.
The mean of ln(high) is 2.58 more than the mean of ln(low), significant at 1
percent.
126
The Wilcoxon test gives p-value = 0.00.
127
Victims are required to estimate the value of the trade secret when reporting the
theft. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Reporting Intellectual Property Crime: A Guide
for Victims of Counterfeiting, Copyright Infringement, and Theft of Trade Secrets,
available at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/AppC-ReportingGuide.pdf.
128
Cf. Paul Shukovsky et al, The Terrorism Trade-Off, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Apr. 11, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 6959916
(discussing post-9/11 FBI fraud-enforcement as a policy of “triage” in which losses
below $150,000 were unlikely to be investigated at all, and losses as high as
$500,000 were “much less likely” than before September 11, 2001, to be
investigated).
125
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2. Cross-Reference Values
Resolving this problem requires going beyond simple comparison
of high and low estimates to estimate trade secret values in EEA cases. The
additional step is to apply a cross-referencing method that uses a
combination of actual sentences and sentencing guidelines.129 Such
guidelines associate the offense level with a corresponding loss figure.
Starting with a base offense level of 6 points to reflect the DOJ
recommendation,130 the figure is adjusted up by two levels for convictions
that include economic espionage or crimes committed by defendants
considered to be insiders of the company.131 Based on incarceration periods
adduced from PACER docket reports and on the offense level, the
corresponding magnitude Xref of trade secret loss may be estimated using
the 2008 Sentencing Guidelines as follows.
First, the incarceration period of the convicted defendant is crossreferenced with the number of offense points given by the sentencing
guidelines, as shown in the first column of Table 3. Because the
incarceration ranges overlap, using the midpoint of each range best
approximates the defendant’s incarceration period. Second, as Table 4
shows, the offense level is calculated using information about the defendant
from case documents and reports. Third, the value derived from Table 4 is
subtracted from that derived in Table 5. The remainder is cross-referenced
with the stolen trade secret values dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines,
and the corresponding value, in the second column of Table 5, is Xref.132
This method produces loss estimates for 41 cases. The Xref values
for these cases had a mean of $241,300 with a standard deviation of
$579,700. As shown in Figure 6, the mean value of Xref is much lower than
is the mean for either the high or low estimates of trade secret value that
was previously discussed. The mode is much lower than that of the high or
low estimates. Moreover, though Figure 6 suggests a lognormal
distribution, statistical analysis fails to confirm this conclusion.133
129

See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 324 (arguing generally that “the
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (Guidelines) reliance on fair market value as
the linchpin of criminal culpability can be incomplete in certain EEA cases, and a
holistic sentencing approach allowing for the consideration of additional factors
would provide a more just result”).
130
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 117, at § IV.F (discussing penalties for
the theft of commercial trade secrets prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839).
131
See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 326–28 (discussing the application
to EEA cases of sentencing guidelines).
132
This method is, of course, the reverse of how courts actually sentence, first
calculating offense points and then deriving the incarceration period.
133
A comparison of four different probability distributions—Weibull, lognormal,
normal, and log-logistic—appears prima facie to favor a log-logistic distribution
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That the Xref values do not follow the same distribution as the high
and low values suggests that the Xref values fundamentally differ from the
other two valuations. Indeed, as Tables 6 and 7 show, the trade secret loss
estimates used in sentencing (Xref) are lower, to a statistically significant
degree, than both high and low estimates. Moreover, as the distribution of
Xref does not take a lognormal distribution, neither does ln(Xref) take a
normal distribution. Accordingly, a paired t-test is inapt to test for
differences between Xref and other valuations.
Better suited is the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
which does not require normality in the underlying distributions. The
Wilcoxon signed-rank test compares the difference between the values of
each pair, sorts all nonzero absolute differences into ascending order to
assign ranks, and calculates the test statistic from the sum of the ranks for
positive and negative differences.134
Tables 6 and 7 compare high and low estimates, respectively, to the
cross-reference estimate Xref. The mean of Xref values is significantly lower
than that of high estimate values135 and lower even than that of low estimate
values.136
These differences further indicate that courts are using considerably
lower cross-reference values than even the low estimates generated by
various valuation models. The difference in raw means between crossreference and low estimates is as much as $6.45 million. Accordingly, the
values used in sentencing are lower, to a statistically significant degree, than
those argued in the course of the court case. Put another way, the basis for
punishment is lower than the basis for the crime as prosecuted.

over the lognormal distribution: the lognormal distribution has an AD statistic of
2.04, whereas the log-logistic has an AD statistic of 2.10. However, the test
statistics for these distributions results in a rejection of the null hypotheses (of
lognormal or log-logistic distribution) with a p-value of 0.01 in both cases.
Therefore, the data do not conform to any of these classical probability
distributions.
134
The test statistic is as follows:
Z = [ min(Sp, Sn) – (n(n+1) / 4) ] / √[ n(n+1)(2n+1) / 24 – ∑(j=1 to l) (tj3 – tj) / 48),
where
n = number of cases with non-zero differences;
l = number of ties;
tj = number of ties;
Sp = sum of positive ranks; and
Sn = sum of negative ranks
135
The Wilcoxon test statistic Z = –3.44, and prob value = 0.001.
136
The Wilcoxon test statistic Z = –2.80, and prob value = 0.005.

146

WHAT’S IT WORTH TO KEEP A SECRET?

[Vol. 13

D. Implications of Valuation Differences
The statistically significant difference between high and low
estimates and their own disconnection from the cross-reference values that
courts use—all for the same trade secret—is cause for concern with respect
to the impact of the economic policy animating criminal trade secret
protection in the United States.
In particular, because the analysis in an EEA case of the magnitude
of loss resulting from trade secret misappropriation largely determines
sentencing—including whether the defendant will be imprisoned—even
slight variations in the estimated loss can be quite meaningful.137 The
evidence discussed here demonstrates that empirically observed sentences
of incarceration may be lower because courts have chosen to apply trade
secret valuations that are particularly conservative.
This may reflect systematically successful arguments by defendants
for the application of the lower values, particularly given the postures of
prosecutor and defendant on opposing ends of the bargaining relationship
and the statistically lower values used in sentencing guidelines. It may also
reflect judicial modesty in appreciation of the difficulties facing the
valuation of trade secrets and a consequent conservatism in favoring lower
value estimates. Indeed, an examination of three case studies revealed that
“the department essentially went in the tank on two of them and just said,
‘We cannot value [the trade secret],’ and [defendants] got probation.”138
Moreover, in addition to the complexity of valuation methods, the
goal of the values used in sentencing (i.e., Xref values) is not solely that of
determining a fair market value:
The purpose of the Guidelines is to achieve sentences that accurately
reflect the culpability of offenders in a consistent, uniform and
proportional manner. In attempting to adhere to both the letter and
purpose of the Guidelines, sentencing courts often struggle to make a
fair market value determination. . . . In EEA cases, where the actual or
intended loss to the victim or gain to the defendant can be
disproportionate to the market value of the trade secrets, use of the

137

Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 341.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Symposium on Federal Sentencing
Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, Session on Economic
Espionage, at 276 (Oct. 13, 2000) (transcript of discussion by David Green, Joseph
F. Savage, Jr. & Carla Mulhern), available at www.ussc.gov/Research_and_
Statistics/Research_Projects/Economic_Crimes/20001012_Symposium/uGroupThr
eeDayTwo.PDF.
138
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market value determination alone will not always produce a sentence
that is just.139

Indeed, the discrepancy between the values argued in the course of
the case and those used in sentencing reflects a recognition by the court that
these values may overestimate the actual or intended loss or gain. Thus, the
criminal context of the EEA may play a large role in accounting for the
statistically significant differences between these values.
Nonetheless, while the evidence indicates a favorable environment
for would-be trade secret misappropriators and thieves, it lowers the
incentives to innovate. Given the wide variability of the valuation methods
and the evident use of lower value estimates in practice, the trade secret
owner faces increased uncertainty as to the strength of the protection
provided by trade secrets.

CONCLUSION
In sum, trade secret misappropriation and theft currently face
diminished disincentives, and trade secret owners confront the uncertainty
of diverse value estimates and, indeed, diverse methodologies of valuation.
This uncertainty, particularly as it drives enforcement, therefore reduces the
practical worth of trade secrets to owners, as a weakly protected trade secret
has lower expected value to its owner. While infringement and damages
payments may be beneficial for the patent owner, such benefit presupposes
a patent-protected research tool.140 Because trade secrets by definition
derive value from their secrecy, the weaker the protection of this value, the
lower the appropriable rewards to innovation.141 Thus, greater uncertainty
associated with the protection of trade secrets lowers incentives to innovate
where trade secrecy is a meaningful mechanism for appropriating value
from innovation.
The EEA sought to increase the overall protection for trade secrets,
to unify the legal status at the federal level, and to provide protection
against foreign economic espionage. Notwithstanding concerns articulated
in the legal literature that the EEA may go too far in increasing the strength
and definition of trade secrets,142 empirical evidence regarding calculations
139

Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 353.
See, e.g., Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions
in Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001).
141
Cf. Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 103 (discussing the economic importance in patent law of reliable
mechanisms for rights enforcement to the practical value of the patent right, and
empirically characterizing this relationship by estimating cumulative abnormal
returns in stock market reactions to patent litigation decisions in the federal courts).
142
See, e.g., Carr et al, supra note 105.
140
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of damages in EEA cases suggests that the EEA is not being used to its full
capacity. Indeed, this evidence is consistent with affirmative steps that even
the generally contentious 112th Congress took to strengthen the use of
federal criminal trade secret protections, first by broadening the
jurisdictional element of the EEA through the Theft of Trade Secrets
Clarification Act of 2012,143 and again by increasing the maximum fines
permitted under the EEA through the Foreign and Economic Espionage
Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012.144
To the intellectual property rights literature of industrial
organization, this article contributes a publicly developed database that is
well suited to examining the values of trade secrets from the perspective of
diverse calculation methods. Parametric comparisons reveal that estimates
of trade secret value do not vary significantly across valuation methods for
the same trade secret. High and low estimates of trade secret value are
lognormally distributed, as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, and are statistically
significantly different. By contrast, cross-reference estimates of trade secret
valuations are distributed neither lognormally nor according to any classical
probability density, and differ statistically from high and low estimates
alike.
More generally, we conclude that the value that trade secrets create
reflects an important economic role for trade secrecy in the larger sphere of
intellectual property protection. The current body of trade secret literature,
both theoretical and empirical, proceeds largely by reference to a more
robust and faster-growing body of patent literature. A review of the
methods used to assess damages in trade secret cases under the EEA
confirms that the methods themselves rely heavily on analytical and
empirical development in patent cases. However, their application to trade
secret cases is complicated by the secret nature and legal ambiguity of trade
secrecy as compared with the disclosure-oriented body of patent law.
As to further study, data on EEA prosecutions provides a unique
opportunity for continuing empirical analysis of the use of trade secrets,
their value, and the nature and consequences of their misappropriation. The
possibility of biases in the selection of cases for prosecution represents a
potentially valuable thread of research. Also potentially fruitful is an
extension of the patent damages models used in trade secret valuation
analysis, particularly if such an extension contributes to the development of
new valuation models specific to trade secrets while taking account of the
doctrinal and enforcement concerns that are peculiar to trade secrecy.

143
144

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 112–269 (Jan. 14, 2013).
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: The Estimated Value of Trade Secrets by Valuation Method
Low Estimates of Trade Secret Value Using Various Methods
EEA Cases 1996–2008
Method

Mean

Std. Dev.

No. of Cases

(i)

Unjust
Enrichment

$ 5,728,000

$ 6,422,000

4

(ii)

Lost Profits

$

$

2

(iii)

Reasonable
Royalty

$ 1,000,000

—

1

(iv)

R&D

$ 10,968,000

$ 18,950,000

4

(v)

Actual
Damages

$

$

5

(vi)

Market Value

$ 10,145,000

708,000

207,000

411,000

390,000

$ 13,832,000

5 (1 outlier
removed)
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Figure 1. Probability Density of Trade Secret Value, Low Estimates
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Figure 2. Confidence Intervals, Lognormally Distributed Low Estimates
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Figure 3. Probability Density of Trade Secret Value, High Estimates
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Figure 4. Confidence Intervals, Lognormally Distributed High Estimates
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Table 2: Paired T-Test for Difference between Low and High Estimates
Paired Sample Statistics
Mean
N
Std. Dev.
ln (Low) 12.33
16
2.04
ln (High) 14.91
16
2.73
Paired Sample Correlations
N
Correlation Sig.
ln (Low) 16
0.46
0.07
& ln
(High)
Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
ln (Low)
95% Confidence
–ln
Interval of the
(High)
Difference
Mean
Std.
Lower
Upper
Dev.
-2.58
2.54
-3.93
-1.22

df
15

Sig. (2tailed)
0.001
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Figure 5: Probability Plot, High and Low Estimates
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Table 3: Incarceration and Corresponding Offence Points

Offence Points
8
9
…
14
15
16
…
42

Range of Months of Incarceration
Incarceration
Incarceration
Minimum
Maximum
0
6
4
10
…
…
15
21
18
24
21
27
…
…
360
Life

[Vol. 13
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Table 4: Calculation of Base Offence Level
Base Offence Points
6
+2
–2
6
+2
+2

Adjustment
Base Offence level according to DOJ Manual
Assumed for all defendants (for more than
minimal planning (according to Zwillinger et
al))
Assumed for all defendants (for acceptance of
responsibility (according to Zwillinger et al))
Subtotal
If Charged with 1831 (economic espionage,
which has a higher offence level)
If considered “insider” (also a higher offence
level)
Total, then cross-referenced with Sentencing
Guidelines
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Table 5: Offence Points Based on Value of Stolen Trade Secret
Points
0
2
4
6
8
…
30

Value of Stolen Trade Secrets
$
5,000
$
5,000
$
10,000
$
30,000
$
70,000
…
$ 400,000,000
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Figure 6. Distribution of Xref Values
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Table 6: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparison, Cross-Reference and
High145
Ranks

Xref < High

Mean
Rank
19 10.37

Sum of
Ranks
197

Xref > High

1

13

Xref = High

0
20

n
Xref – High Negative
Ranks
Positive
Ranks
Ties
Total
Test Statistics
Z
Xref –
High

145

-3.435

13

Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
0.001

For this table and the next, the asymptotic significance for the Z-stat is two
tailed.
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Table 7: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparison, Cross-Reference and Low
Ranks

Xref < Low

Mean
Rank
16 11.25

Sum of
Ranks
180

Xref > Low

4

30

Xref = Low

0
20

n
Xref –
Low

Negative
Ranks
Positive
Ranks
Ties
Total
Test Statistics
Z
Xref –
Low

-2.800

Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
0.005

7.50

